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Introduction
After a period of rapid expansion in 1983 and 1984, the American economy
is visibly slowing. Pessimists talk about the coming recession in late 1986 or early
1987, while the optimists see economic growth during the next several years at
a rate that at best is only one-half of the 1984 pace. Simultaneously, fears of
debt crises-farm and urban, domestic and foreign-are increasingly expressed.
Moreover, concerns about import penetration and the resultant job losses are
rising even more rapidly than the flows of goods and services from overseas.
All this creates an uninspiring if not dismal economic outlook in the minds
of many.
On reflection, the discouraging talk relies on the oldest and simplest method
of forecasting: extrapolating the most current experience. As Patrick Henry so
eloquently said, there was only one lamp by which his feet were guided, the lamp
of experience. But he was not limiting himself to the last two yards that he had
walked! In the broader perspective of American economic history, there is little
support for the simpleminded approach to predicting economic trends. Rates
of expansion vary greatly, and periods of growth and decline alternate.
A common pitfall awaits people who apply the experience to which Patrick
Henry referred to in too limited and too simple a fashion. For example, the
forecasts in Figures 1A and 1B rely on that fundamentally accurate but often
misleading postulate of geometry: Two points determine a straight line. Thus,
merely extending the most recent experience in 1982-a sharp decline from
1981-would have resulted in expectations of an accelerating recession in 1983
and 1984 (see Figure 1A). That would have missed entirely the strong recovery
that occurred during that period. In only slight exaggeration, it may be said that
this approach was widely followed; it typified the pessimism of those who, in
1981 and 1982, were writing about the fundamental weakness of the American
industrial economy and advocating ambitious industrial policy approaches to
deal with that situation.
An example of such thinking was provided by Ira Magaziner and Robert Reich
in 1982. They wrote in Minding America's Business, "The U.S. economy is in
crisis ... In the absence of new strategic directions, the crisis can only deepen."
Similarly, extrapolating the sharp growth of 1983 and 1984 in the same
simpleminded linear fashion would have yielded a misleading "up, up and
away" forecast for the present (see Figure 1B). In essence, this was the spirit of
the more optimistic supply-siders who expected unbroken prosperity to result
from the 1981 tax cuts.

Dr. Murray Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and Director of the
Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. Richard Burr
is a Writer/Analyst and Richard Cook is a Research Assistant at the Center. The authors are indebted
to Kenneth Chilton and Arthur Denzau for numerous helpful suggestions.
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THE HAZARDS OF FORECASTING A LINEAR ECONOMY
Figure lA
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Sectors of the American economy most heavily affected by imports are
responding far more dramatically. Here the often-prevalent voices of doom and
gloom contend that the recent penetration of U.S. domestic markets by foreign
producers will not only continue but likely will accelerate. A similar cry echoes
from other sectors of manufacturing, where observers see only a decisive shift
to services in the future.
John Naisbitt's 1982 book, Megatrends, helped to set this mood with
statements such as, "It's becoming clear that yesterday is over, and as the Third
World prepares to take over the major industrial tasks, the developed countries
must move on to the new enterprises." More recently the chief executive of a
major chemical corporation embellished this negative sentiment when he
described the competitive environment as "a zero-sum global economy." In his
view, this means that "if individual companies expect to grow they will increasingly have to do it at someone else's expense."

T
1981

1982

1983

US. economic history clearly shows that Americans do not live
in a linear world. During uhard times,,, steps are often taken
that provide the basis for future expansion.

1984

Figure lB

There is great danger that the latest two points in economic experience will
continue not only to determine a straight line for the short run, but to influence
excessively expectations for the long run. Thus, during this current period of
short-term economic slowdown, many analysts are decreasing their long-term
projections-their expectations of the growth of the American economy-for
the entire decade ahead.

In each of these cases, the implicit forecasting approach used is to extrapolate
naively the most recent experience. Yet U.S. economic history clearly shows that
Americans do not live in a linear world. For one thing, important feedback
effects occur. During periods of extremely rapid growth, marginal resources are
brought into production, lowering productivity while raising costs. This contributes to inflationary pressures, which lead to changes in economic policynotably a move to restraint-that halt the expansion.
Thus, rapid growth in the first half of the 1950s (with an average annual
increase in real GNP of 4.7 percent) was followed by a slower pace in the second
half of the decade (3.2 percent yearly). Similarly, a strong growth pace in the
1960s-when real GNP increased at the average rate of 4.2 percent a yearwas followed by the slower 3.3 percent rate of the 1970s.
During "hard times," steps are often taken that provide the basis for future
expansion. These include those cost-cutting, product and process innovations
and other productivity-raising moves that help to turn the tide. The United States
is experiencing such a period right now. There are three key forces that make
a period of sustained prosperity in the decade of the 1990s more likely:
(1) A variety of actions that reduce the cost of producing goods and services
in the United States.
(2) New awareness of personal responsibility for the quality of what
Americans produce.
(3) More rapid growth in investments in research and development, the basic
fuel for innovation and technical progress.
Let us examine the growing importance of each of these key forces.
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Reducing the Cost of Production
For a variety of sensible reasons-most notably to keep up with foreign
competition-many American business firms have taken actions during the past
several years that reduce the domestic cost of production. These actions range
from simple changes in production methods to a basic restructuring of ~he
business firm. Since compensation of employees constitutes about two-thirds
of the cost of producing the nation's output, labor costs are a natural starting
point for cost cutting.
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Reducing Labor Costs
The measureable changes that are occurring in the labor market are dramatic.
For example, the 54 strikes involving 1,000 or more workers in the United States
during 1985 were the fewest since 1947, when the Labor Department first began
compiling such statistics. In addition, the 324,000 workers involved in the strikes
was the lowest number of strikers on record. Figure 2 shows vividly the nonlinear nature of the history of labor-management disputes in the United States
since the end of World War II. In any event, the American economy is enjoying a sustained period of domestic labor peace.
More fundamentally, competitiveness has been enhanced by the substantial
slowing of the rise in nominal wage costs. In 1980, the average worker in the
private sector in this country received a 9.0 percent wage increase. By 1984, the
average annual increase was down to 4.1 percent (see Table 1).
Perhaps surprising to the proverbial man on the street, the change also turns
out to be beneficial from the workers' viewpoint. In real terms (after boiling
out the effects of inflation), the average worker in 1980 suffered a 0.2 percent
decline in real wage rates. In contrast, 1984 witnessed a real increase of 0.3
percent-a modest change but in the desired direction. The downward trend
in nominal wage costs was similar in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors.
Moreover, the pace of negotiated wage increases in union agreements has
slowed visibly. During the past four years, some groups of workers have actually
experienced wage cuts (see Table 2). For example, in 1980, 71 percent of the
workers covered in major collective bargaining settlements received an annual
wage increase of 8 percent or more. By 1985, only 4 percent of the workers were
in that category-and 26 percent received no increase or actually suffered a
decrease. Looking ahead, the Conference Board's Labor Outlook Panel is forecasting a modest 3.6 percent overall increase in average hourly earnings in 1986.
Some analysts see a further shift in the relative bargaining power of management and labor resulting from greater use of "contingent" employees. For example, companies that are trying to respond to rapid market changes, especially
due to foreign competition, are increasingly using temporary and employeeleasing arrangements. Contingent employees also serve as a buffer to protect
the security of regular employees.
5

Table 1
THE DECELERATION OF EMPWYMENT COSTS
Annual Percent Change in the Labor Cost Index, 1980-1984
Sector

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

Total Private Non-Farm

9.00Jo

8.8%

6.3%

5.0%

4.1%

Manufacturing
Durables
Non-durables

9.4
9.9
8.6

8.7
9.2
7.7

5.6
5.6
5.8

4.3
4.1
5.6

4.4
4.1
4.9

Non-manufacturing
Construction
Transportation and
Public Utilities
Retail Trade
Wholesale Trade
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate
Services

8.8
8.7

9.0
8.8

6.5
5.2

5.5
4.5

4.0
1.3

11.2
7.0
10.0

8.4
7.5
7.8

7.2
4.1
6.2

7.3
4.7
4.8

3.3
5.1
5.5

7.4
8.8

9.9
10.6

6.5
8.0

8.5
6.0

-.9
6.2

· By Industry

Table 2
WAGE RATE CHANGES FOR MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Percent of Workers by Category of Wage Change, 1980-1984
First-Year
Wage
Adjustment

By Occupation
White Collar
Blue Collar
Service Workers

employee performing one task. With new agreements to perform a number of
different tasks, however, fewer workers are required or the same number of
workers can produce more. Also, there is less down time due to waiting for a
worker with the right classification. This illustrates one among many
efficiencies-large and small-which, in the aggregate, can result in substantial increases in productivity and hence competitiveness.
For example, a Chrysler plant in Indiana has reduced labor costs 30 percent
or $2.8 million a year by getting workers to agree to perform tasks outside their
crafts. Goodyear has signed a pact that allows the 429 craftsmen at its Alabama
plant to work outside their trade as much as 25 percent of the time if necessary.
General Motors successfully negotiated with its Manville, Ohio, union to
eliminate jobs such as machinists' "tool chasers." Having machinists get their
own tools and other changes raised productivity in one stamping plant by 26
percent.
Work-rule changes also have saved money in the petroleum industry, where
refiners report that output per worker increased by more than 10 percent in
recent years. One oil company, American Petrofina, merged six classifications
into two at one refinery, cutting the workforce by 25 percent. The move saved
$4 million a year.

8.7
9.5
8.1

9.1
8.6
8.5

6.4
5.6
8.5

5.9
5.0
5.2

4.4
3.6
6.2

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Increasing Productive Efficiency
While management negotiations with unions are stabilizing labor costs
import penetration has sparked a war on other costs. In addition to holdin~
down the cost of labor, firms are attempting to get more for the labor dollars
they do spend by improving productivity. More flexible work rules and improved
worker attitudes are two of the more important methods being used.
Loosened work rules can generate important savings in the production
process. The traditional way was to have narrow job classifications, with each
6

Decrease
No change
Increase
0-4 percent
4-8 percent
8 percent and
over
Average Percent
Change

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985
(first six months)

OOJo

50Jo

0

3

2%
42

15%
22

5%
18

4%
22

4
25

3
9

9
23

14
39

44
30

38
33

71

81

24

10

2

4

2.4

2.8

9.5

9.8

3.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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2.6

Some companies have attempted to improve worker attitudes on the
reasonable assumption that more motivated workers do better quality work.
At Jones & Laughlin, a major steel maker, a labor-management participation
team analyzes production problems and suggests ways of improving efficiency.
The company saved $7 5 million in 1982largely because of employee suggestions
and workforce cutbacks that resulted in the remaining workers being assigned
more duties.
The Harley-Davidson Motor Company is also making great strides. Although
the motorcycle maker has been protected by high tariffs, those tariff rates will
decline automatically to 4 percent in 1988 from the 24 percent level levied in 1985.
The prospect of dwindling protection has caused the company to adopt
Japanese management techniques that are partially responsible for making it
profitable again.
Indeed, Harley-Davidson has attracted executives from other companies to
its monthly seminars on efficient management. The firm has sharply decreased
absenteeism by maintaining an open-door policy with workers and discussing
employee complaints. Costs of fixing motorcycles on warranty have plummeted
as a result of a new commitment to quality, the company says. This experience
is not now unique in American industry.
But tough negotiations with labor can cause backlashes. United Airlines
pilots, angry because they believe the company tried to break the Air Line Pilots
Association during a 29-day strike in 1985, are reportedly wasting fuel. A veteran
United pilot told a reporter that an "awful lot of pilots are burning more gas.
We're not interested in saving money for the company any more."

on the other side of town and shipped to the final assembly location.
A key element at Flint is the just-in-time system of inventory management.
The complex operates without the usual "safety net" in a conscious effort to
force discipline into a manufacturing system that formerly operated with convenient, but expensive, fallback positions. If a quality problem now arises in
any part of the system, it must be corrected immediately. Otherwise, the entire
production operation may grind to a halt.

Proponents of pursuing joint ventures with Japanese and South Korean
companies defend it as a way of saving some American jobs; opponents
view such out-sourcing as ~~xporting,, of jobs.

Changes in Production Approaches
Several American companies have adopted the Japanese just-in-time inventory system in which components are provided as needed instead of having large
batches made in advance and stored. Harley-Davidson, for example, reports that
the system freed $22 million previously tied up in inventory at a York, Pennsylvania, plant alone and dramatically reduced reorder lead times.
A Chrysler plant in Fenton, Missouri, also is using the just-in-time approach.
The system cut its inventory to $20 million from $29 million, resulting in about
$1 million a year savings in interest costs. Reduced inventory also has meant less
damage to parts from overcrowded storage conditions.
One of the most ambitious production improvement efforts to date is the
General Motors Flint Assembly project, which is converting a 60-year-old complex of unrelated component manufacturing and auto assembly plants into a
500-acre integrated production facility.
The Flint Assembly Complex builds, virtually under one roof, most of the
major components needed for the front-wheel drive vehicles that replace the
Buick LeSabre and the Olds Delta 88. The work performed includes engines,
transmission components and complete bodies. In effect, steel blanks for body
construction enter at one end of the plant and finished cars leave at the other.
Previously, partially completed automobile bodies were built at a body plant

As might be expected, considerable investment is required, especially in the
company's workforce. Between 4,000 and 5,000 employees are receiving training in new technical skills in three Flint-area educational institutions. Building
on the ongoing Quality of Work Life program, union officials participated in
the planning of Flint Assembly throughout its development.
Out-Sourcing. Each of the major auto producers is pursuing joint ventures
with Japanese and South Korean companies as a long-term way of cutting costs
on small cars. Proponents of this approach defend it as a way of saving some
American jobs, while opponents view such out-sourcing as "exporting" of jobs.
In any event, General Motors has at least four separate agreements with
Japanese and South Korean affiliates to supply up to 500,000 cars a year to its
U.S. dealers. Ford has contracts pending with Japan's Mazda Motor Corporation and Korea's Kia Industrial Company. Chrysler has signed ventures with
Mitsubishi Motors and Samsung Corporation.
The American steel industry is seeing the benefits in a similar arrangement.
National Steel Corporation, which is half-owned by Nippon Kokan, has
enhanced its productivity. In the first year of Japanese involvement, National
increased the amount of prime finished product made from molten steel by
3 percent. National Steel President Robert McBride estimates that a 1 percent
increase in product yield adds $20 million to the company's profitability.
Caterpillar Tractor Company, the world's largest manufacturer of heavy construction equipment, also has learned this lesson. The company reached its goal
of slashing costs by more than 20 percent by the end of 1985, a year ahead of
schedule. It has reduced its workfo_rce by one-third and increased the number
of parts it acquires from outside. Caterpillar's efforts seem to be paying off. The
company reported a fourth-quarter 1985 pre-tax profit of $87 million, compared
with a loss of $251 million for the same period in 1984.
Targeting Capital Spending. Simultaneously, the composition of new capital
spending by American industrial firms has shifted away in large measure from
additions to productive capacity and toward replacement of existing machinery
and facilities with more efficient equipment. For example, the outlays for new
plant and equipment devoted to computers and instruments rose from $28
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billion in 1970 to $142 billion in 1983. Such changes curb the unit cost of production rather than expand the total amount of product.
In some cases, the use of new technology can result in products manufactured
more efficiently than at modern foreign plants. One ton of steel production at
Chaparral Steel is estimated to use 1.8 man-hours, whereas the Japanese on
average require 2.3 man-hours. Another steelmaker, Timken Company, invested
$500 million in an advanced mill in the midst of the last recession. The new
facility makes better quality steel for its tapered roller bearings, the anti-friction
devices Timken invented.
Other Strategies. Price reductions forcing cost containment have emerged as
the dominant way that American firms respond to import pressures. But it is
clear that they rely on other approaches simultaneously. In addition, there are
many variations on the price or economizing approach to meeting foreign
competition.
For example, in the auto manufacturing industry for many years operations
had been based on achieving economies of scale via high-volume, long-running
production with fairly rigid product specifications. Because economies of scale
emphasized large factories and standard product design, changes in the product
could become expensive. Today, as a result of a shift to computer-based
manufacturing, production can be based on economies of scope. This newer
approach allows for low-cost, flexible production of a variety of products on
the same automated equipment.
An extension of this economizing strategy is leading to important structural
changes in a great many of the larger American corporations. The horizontally
integrated firm, producing virtually every product in the markets in which it
operates, is becoming less prevalent. Many companies are preferring to
specialize, focusing on specific product niches that are secure against foreign
competition.
On reflection, this is to be expected as U.S. firms find themselves competing
more fully in a global economy. Surely far fewer of our domestic markets can
be properly thought of as part of a closed economy.

and businesses, including its commodity-metals business and its European bulkchemical, plastics and polyethylene businesses. Carbide also wrote down other
assets totalling $865 million, including petrochemicals, metals and carbons
segments. At the same time, the company built an industrial gases plant in Spain,
acquired a consumer products business in France and entered an industrial gases
joint venture in Italy.
Companies also are combatting imports with financing innovations. Major
U.S. car manufacturers have increased sales by providing low-interest-rate
financing on new cars. In effect, this means squeezing profit margins in an effort
to remain competitive.
In addition, a rapid rate of product innovation has been emphasized.
American shoe firms such as Timberland Company, Reebok International and
Rockport Company have responded with stylish footwear to ward off foreign
competition. Even apparel manufacturing, one of the most import-affected
industries, is using style to compete with low-cost foreign products. Companies
such as RJMJ Inc. continue to make a profit selling women's pants and shorts
through improved timing and greater flexibility of production. Whereas foreign
apparel makers need at least six months' lead time to coordinate manufacturing
with retail sales, RJMJ's president says his company "can turn on a dime. We
can get piece goods to [our plants] in a day or two and produce products for
the shelves in three to four weeks. That enables us to catch a trend."
The Influence of Government
Meanwhile, government actions to reduce the value of the dollar in world currency markets are helping American firms to compete more effectively both at
home and abroad. Despite some softening in the dollar in 1985, the average value
of the dollar in relation to other major currencies (the "trade-weighted" dollar)
remains almost 40 percent higher than the level in 1980. This is the equivalent
of a special 40 percent tax levied on American producers, exacerbating other
cost differences with their foreign competitors.

A significant weakening of the dollar would enhance the
effectiveness of the various private-sector strategies to
restore the competitiveness of American firms.

In an ambitious restructuring effort, General Electric raised about $5 billion
since 1981 by selling off 155 divisions. Among them were GE's small-appliance
operation, which manufactures toasters and irons, and Utah International, a
natural-resource subsidiary.
The company's new strategy is to move gradually away from traditional
manufacturing and to focus instead on growth industries such as electronics and
financial services. The $5 billion proceeds from its restructuring activities helped
to finance its acquisition of RCA, a move strengthening GE's position in
electronics and services.
The Union Carbide Corporation, a firm under severe pressure for many
reasons in addition to foreign competition, also has undergone extensive restructuring. It has divested $500 million in what it now views as "non-strategic" assets

There are many reasons for the strong dollar. Some of these are inherently
favorable, such as the worldwide view that the American economy is a major
"safe haven" for investors. There is little concern here about expropriation or
the other arbitrary governmental actions that have occurred so frequently
overseas and have increased the relative risk of investing in many other countries.
But some of the reasons for the strong dollar are not so benign, such as the
massive budget deficits whose financing has forced real interest rates up so high.
That, in turn, has increased the foreign demand for dollars and in the process
raised the "price" (or exchange rate) of dollars.
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Recent governmental policies and actions have attempted to restore the U.S.
dollar to its earlier exchange rate relationships. The passage of the GrammRudman-Hollings bill represents a congressional and presidential commitment
to eliminate the federal budget deficit by 1991. The specific budget cuts needed
to achieve that goal, however, have not yet been designated by the Congress or
the White House.
Simultaneously, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker has embarked on an
international cooperative effort to encourage the downward movement of the
dollar in foreign exchange markets. A significant weakening of the dollar would
enhance the effectiveness of the various private-sector strategies to restore the
competitiveness of American firms and of the goods and services that they produce and sell. But lasting changes in exchange rates require more substantive
actions than merely financial intervention by governments in international currency markets. Sustained improvements in monetary and fiscal policies are
required.

Despite increased imports, Steinway & Sons is forecasting increased sales.
Steinway President Lloyd Meyer contends that American manufacturers
generally have rested too long on their laurels and allowed importers to equal
them in quality. "I blame management for losing the quality edge:' Steinway
Company's president maintains.
Indeed, ignoring or de-emphasizing quality can be costly, as a Harvard
Business School study of the air conditioning industry demonstrated. Professor
David Garvin found that the failure rates of room air conditioners from the
lowest-quality producers were between 500 and 1,000 times greater than those
from the highest-quality producers.
Garvin analyzed Japanese and American firms in an industry where practically the same assembly-line processes and manufacturing equipment are used

Table 3
U.S. CONSUMERS' VIEWS ON PRODUCT QUALITY
July-August 1985 Survey

Improving the Quality of U.S. Products
An important lesson that American companies have learned in recent years
is that "Made in Japan" (or South Korea or Taiwan) is no longer synonomous
with shoddy quality. In fact, the inroads of foreign competition into U.S.
domestic markets have frequently been caused by the superior quality of the
import rather than just lower cost. As a result, unprecedented pressure has been
generated for improving the quality of products that American businesses
manufacture.
A 1985 poll on product quality showed mixed results. In many product
categories, American-made items were rated as being of higher quality than the
corresponding import (see Table 3). Important examples of perceived U.S.
superiority in quality included furniture, clothing, personal computers, appliances and-by a smaller margin-automobiles. However, the survey also
showed that 45 percent of the respondents viewed imported consumer electronics goods (televisions, radios and VCRs) as being of higher quality, while
only 40 percent thought the same goods made in the United States were of higher
quality. Many recent actions by U.S. companies to deal with the quality challenge
demonstrate the feedback effects of our non-linear economy.
Meeting Domestic Quality Requirements
Many U.S. firms are responding positively to the consumer preference for
quality. For example, Steinway & Sons, the well-known piano manufacturer, facing rising competition from Yamaha and Kawai, has improved the quality of
its pianos, which remain popular with concert pianists. The company proudly
recalls that 35 of the 37 Asian contestants performed on Steinway grands at a
recent international competition.
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Percent Viewing
U.S. Goods as
Higher Quality

Percent Viewing
Foreign Goods as
Higher Quality

Furniture

840Jo

4%

Major appliances

78

6

Clothing

70

13

Small appliances

58

19

Automobiles

46

38

Personal computers

41

22

TVs, radios, VCRs, etc.

40

45

Weighted Average

53%

14%

Item

Source: American Society for Quality Control.
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to make an essentially standardized product. Therefore, the staggering differences in performance between Japanese and American firms could not be attributed to differences in technology or capital.
Japanese comp(.lnies were reported to be far superior to their U.S. counterparts in many measurable ways. The average U.S. assembly-line defect rate was
almost 70 times that of the Japanese and their average first -year service call rate
nearly 17 times the Japanese service call rate. Products made by the worst
Japanese company had an average failure rate less than half that of the best U.S.
manufacturer.
The key payoff of higher quality comes from the savings realized from
avoiding the costs of reworking defective products or replacing defective parts.
Garvin noted that "failures are much more expensive to fix after a unit has been
assembled than before." In addition, customer complaints about productseven when they are subsequently replaced-often result in the long-term erosion of a company's customer base.
Westinghouse Electric is an example of a corporation that can show benefits
from emphasizing quality. It has established 2,000 quality circles involving
20,000 employees and a Quality College to foster participative management and
quality training. The result has been that Westinghouse has averaged real
productivity gains of 7 percent a year for three years in a row, 1982 through 1984.
Thomas Murrin, president of Westinghouse's energy and advanced technology
group, says such a result "means that every 10 years you double your output
without adding any resources."
Emphasizing quality has also profited Harley-Davidson. Management places
more responsibility on the individual worker, coaching employees to evaluate
their own work and improve the quality of the components. All employees
receive 40 hours of training in statistics so they better understand how to measure
the quality of their output and improvements in it. The moves have caused a
rise in defect-free motorcycles coming off the assembly line. Whereas 50 percent of the motorcycles were free of defects five years ago, 99 percent are now
reported to be flawless.
High-technology industry also is concentrating on quality. In 1980, HewlettPackard tested semiconductors from three American companies and three
Japanese firms, and found that the Japanese failure rate was one-sixth that of
the U.S. producers. But the American firms virtually had closed the gap when
the same test was made two years later.
America's automakers, long regarded as the epitome of old-line industry, are
also making substantial strides. On a crash program to close the "quality gap"
with their foreign counterparts, particularly the Japanese, domestic automobile
manufacturers have been pressuring American steel manufacturers to improve
their performance. Three years ago, for example, Ford was rejecting and returning nearly 9 percent of the steel it purchased from suppliers because of surface
defects or faulty chemistry. Now the rate has been reduced to less than 2 percent.
One way of improving quality is to iron out the bugs in the assembly process
before shipping the product. OM took this step in its new Wentzville, Missouri,
14
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facility. The announcement was unusual apparently because the company' sand the industry's-previous practice was to iron out these problems while continuing production. Quality problems in the past were thus passed on to the
dealers and customers to avoid the huge costs of halting production.
A somewhat similar experience occurred in the fall of 1985 in Ford's
automotive operations in Dearborn, Michigan. Production was delayed because
the rear doors were not meeting the rear fenders correctly. Ford executive Lou
Ross was quoted as saying, "Ten years ago, confronted with the same problem,
we would have built on the appointed day. Today ... we start when we meet the
standard."
The scene was repeated at a Detroit-area GM plant, where faulty Cadillacs
and Chevrolet Caprices remained in the repair lots instead of being shipped to
the dealers. "What really blows the minds of people today is that we won't ship
cars if we don't have the quality right," says GM spokesman Clifford Merriott.
Unintentionally repeating Ford's estimate, he adds, "There's no doubt that 10
years ago we would have shipped those cars."
"Ha! Ten years ago?" says M.L. Douglas, president of the United Auto
Workers' Local 22. "It's more like two years ago ... But people are beginning
to realize that we just can't do things like that anymore." In retrospect, how could
the average worker on the production floor have been expected to really care
about quality when management appeared to be so indifferent?
Pushing faulty cars out the factory door also can be expensive. Chrysler
learned that lesson when it tried to meet a deadline on the Plymouth Volare/
Dodge Aspen models in the mid-1970s. "Not doing any galvanizing on the
Aspen/Volare cost us $100 million because of rust," Chrysler Chairman Lee
Iacocca says. The rest of the industry seems to have learned the lesson. Ford now
allows 36 months from car design to production instead of the former 28
months.
Auto companies also have improved quality through quick response to defects
in parts. Chrysler's Fenton, Missouri, plant now corrects problems with parts
in two days. A decade ago, the turnaround time could have been as much
as 20 days.
Catering to Foreign Customers

Quality is not only important to American consumers, but especially to
foreign consumers, notably the Japanese. Ocean Foods of Astoria, Inc. in
Oregon has capitalized on the Japanese consumers' characteristic concern for
higher-quality products, making Japan one of its principal markets. "They'll
pay top dollar for your product, but only if it's of absolute top quality," says
Grant Larson, vice president of Ocean Foods. "They are unmovable when it
comes to quality control."
Ocean Foods pays special attention to detail in its food processing to ensure
mandatory quality control for the finicky Japanese. In the words of one senior
executive of the firm:
When we catch the fish, they are eviscerated and stacked a precise way. Then
15

the fish are flash-frozen. If the salmon aren't arranged this way prior to freezing, some of them will freeze at uneven temperatures. The flesh can become
slightly discolored, or part of a tail will stick to the salmon below or above
it and break off. If there is the slightest discoloration of the fish, or if part
of the tail is broken off, forget it. You just won't sell that salmon [to the
Japanese].
Other U.S. companies are apparently realizing the appreciation that the
Japanese have for quality-the average consumer in Japan spends about $600
a year on American-made goods (the average U.S. consumer spends only $290
a year on Japanese products). Although few people in Japan had heard of Cross
pens a decade or so ago, they have become a status symbol and are considered
a most desirable business gift. Comparable results have occurred for other
overseas competitors in Japan. Bondhus Corporation hand tools command 80
percent of the Japanese market even though five Japanese firms have lower
prices.

approach to employee relations to ensure that workers put into practice what
the company preaches: It practices egalitarianism in many aspects of its activities
in an effort to improve output and quality. "We consider everyone to be line,
there are no staff positions per se," says Chaparral President Gordon Forward.
The company has no customer service representatives, for example. Production
managers answer customer complaints. Forward says, "You ought to see how
motivated they are to fix the problem when they come back."

The most effective quality controls involve a shift in the
locus of responsibility-from inspectors to the
employees who actually do the work.
Thus, the most effective quality controls involve, in effect, a shift in the locus
of responsibility-from the inspectors in the quality control department to the
employees who actually do the work. Pushed by foreign competition and the
non-linear nature of America's free-market economy, many U.S. companies are
discovering this way to achieve higher-quality production.

Commitments to Quality
The enhanced concern with improving quality in American industry has not
been primarily a matter of setting up new quality control departments or even
expanding existing ones. After all, companies in the United States traditionally
devoted far more resources to quality-control efforts than did their foreign
counterparts.
But quality assurance is more than just a collection of expensive scientific
and professional personnel checking, reviewing and improving production practices. Producing quality requires emphasizing this aspect of the production
process throughout the firm.
The air-conditioner-industry study cited earlier confirms this point. Japanese
companies pay more attention to quality than many of their American competitors by means of such innovations as creating internal consumer review
boards to evaluate the products. Another way the Japanese foster quality is by
having top management hold daily review meetings about quality. In contrast,
American firms with the lowest assembly defect rates met 10 times a month;
the worst-quality U.S. companies averaged four such meetings a month.
Management's message was reflected on the front lines of production. Firstline supervisors at four of six Japanese air conditioner manufacturers surveyed
said quality was most important to management; their counterparts at nine of
11 U.S. companies surveyed said meeting the production schedule was the highest
priority.
Management can communicate its emphasis on quality by paying attention
even to small details. For instance, National Steel now requires workers to clean
their work stations instead of leaving the task for janitors. The Japanese
co-owners, who suggested the policy, reasoned that if workers have enough pride
to take care of their work stations, they might also care more for their product.
But there is more to improving quality than just providing an example. For
instance, Chaparral Steel Company uses an unusual but no longer novel

Even though many government officials occasionally wax eloquent about the
science policy of the federal government, the United States lacks a comprehensive policy on the subject. Others can debate whether that is good or bad. What
is relevant to this analysis is that the great bulk of research and development
financed and sponsored by the federal government is not a result of deliberate
actions to carry out a policy on "science." Rather, in most instances, it is more
a matter of happenstance. Yet a shift in science funding has powerful effects
on the competitiveness of American industry.
Thus, in the haphazard nature of science policy, the completion of the "man
on the moon" project by NASA meant a reduction in that agency's budget. It
just so happens that NASA devotes one of the highest percentages of expenditures to R & D among federal agencies. As shown in Table 4, NASA spent
one-half of its budget on R & Din 1981, while the ratio for the federal government as a whole was less than 5 percent. Thus, a shift in emphasis in the federal
budget away from space exploration was simultaneously a move to downgrade
the importance of science in the federal government.
Similarly, and of greater consequence because of its overwhelming size, the
post-Vietnam cutbacks in the military budget meant a major decline in the
volume of federal R & D funding-but not as a deliberate policy. The shift in
emphasis in the federal budget during the 1970s from, so to speak, warfare to
welfare meant a shift of resources away from the most R & D-intensive sectors
of the budget. Simultaneously, a rapid expansion occurred in federal spending
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The Accelerating Growth of Research and Development

The Recent Rise in Federal Funding
However, the massive buildup in U.S. defense spending begun in 1981 has
ended the slowdown of federal R & D outlays that occurred in the 1970s. Now
the largest dollar increases in federal expenditures are budgeted for the Pentagon,
a part of the government that spends more than twice the proportion of its

budget on R & D than the typical civilian agency. To be sure, there is considerable
controversy about the extent to which R & D spending by the military establishment benefits the civilian economy. Certainly not all military R & D has commercial applications. In fact, America has considerable negative experience with
past attempts to apply defense technology directly to civilian uses.
A recent analysis of approximately 1,000 large U.S. manufacturing firms concluded that company-financed spending on R & Dis more productive than
federally-financed research. Presumably, the firm spends money on R & D to
raise its productivity and profits, while government-financed R & Dis undertaken primarily to fulfill specific research contracts for which the firm is
remunerated directly.
It does seem, however, that subcontractors and supplying firms in the electronics and instruments industries, for example, have enjoyed considerable
success in commercializing their defense-financed technology. In contrast, the
large aerospace firms have demonstrated only limited ability to diversify outside of aviation.
All in all, when the Department of Defense devotes an additional $100 billion
to applications of science and engineering in a half decade, there is a great
possibility that a larger stream of product and process innovation will occur in
the years ahead. That possibility is reinforced by the Pentagon's current tendency
to support technological advancement in areas having civilian applications such
as computers.
For example, the Department of Defense recently awarded Carnegie-Mellon
University a $103 million contract to develop and operate a Software Engineering Institute. The bulk of the Institute's work will be original, unclassified
research, including development of better education processes for teaching software. Although its main customers will be defense contractors, a second tier will
include companies that build such commercial items as telecommunications and
air traffic control systems.
Moreover,- some analysts contend that the Pentagon's Strategic Defense
Initiative (popularly known as "Star Wars") will yield commercial applications
in such areas as supercomputers, software, sophisticated sensors and space
technology.
High-yield supercomputers are useful in a wide range of scientific and industrial applications, including telecommunications, weather forecasting, medical
research and aircraft design. The need to automate SDI systems is also expected
to advance commercial applications in the emerging field of artificial intelligence. Likewise, in order to meet the tracking requirements of SDI,
developments will take place in optical design and manufacturing that can have
important civilian uses.
There is no need to jump to the conclusion that the most effective way of
promoting scientific progress in the United States is to encourage a military
buildup. Surely, the direct expenditure of these funds on civilian-oriented
R & D, especially of a commercial orientation, would be expected to be far more
productive. But the fact remains that the only time when Congress will appro-
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Table 4
FEDERAL AGENCY R & D AND TOTAL OUTLAYS IN 1984
R&D
Total
Outlays Outlays
(in billions)

Department or Agency

R&D/
Total
(percent)

Above-average R & D Ratios
National Science Foundation
NASA
Energy Department
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Commerce Department
Defense Department
Foreign aid (non-military)
Interior Department
Environmental Protection Agency

$ 1.1
3.5
4.7
.2
.3
23.6
.1
.4
.3

$ 1.2
7.0
10.6
.5
1.9
220.8
1.1
4.9
4.1

Total, Federal Government

40.5

851.8

4.8

.9

37.5

2.4

4.5
.3
.2
.4

292.3
23.9
25.6
220.4

1.5
1.3
0.8
0.2

Below-average R & D Ratios
Agriculture Department
Health and Human Services
Department
Transportation Department
Veterans Administration
All other

91.7%
50.0
44.3
40.0
15.8
10.7
9.1
8.2
7.3

Source: Compiled from data prepared by U.S. Office of Management and
Budget.

programs that involve the least amount of outlays for science and technology,
notably the Department of Health and Human Services (in the form of transfer
payments) and the Department of Agriculture (primarily price-support
subsidies).

priate tens of billions of dollars on R & D in a half decade is when it elevates
national defense and such other R & D-intensive functions of government as
space exploration and energy development to the top of the priority list. In 1984,
for example, the Department of Defense spent $23.6 billion for R & D, the
Department of Energy $4.7 billion and NASA $3.5 billion.

Table 5
ESTIMATED RETURNS TOR & D

Researcher

Rate of
Return

Area
Covered

Years
Covered

Scherer

70-1040Jo

Macroeconomy

1973-78

Terleckyj

29-78

Macroeconomy

1946-66

Fellner

31-55

Macroeconomy

1953-66

Nadiri

20

Manufacturing

1958-75

Griliches

17

Manufacturing

1957-65

The only time when Congress will appropriate tens of billions of dollars on
R & D in a half decade is when it elevates national defense, space
exploration and energy development to the top of the priority list.
In striking contrast, when Congress decides to be generous to science and
technology per se, it expands the budgets of the major science agencies by only
tens of millions or, at best, by several hundred million dollars. In 1984, the total
budget of the National Science Foundation came to $1.2 billion. That year the
Department of Commerce spent about $300 million on the Bureau of Standards and all of its other scientific activities. The Department of the Interior
devoted approximately $400 million to the Coast and Geodetic Survey and other
R & D bureaus.
Also, federal funding for R & D tends to fall when income transfer programs
are elevated to higher priority in the budget. In the case of the Department of
Health and Human Services, R & D expenditures in 1984 comprised 1.5 percent of its budget (mainly for the National Institutes of Health).

Note: Variations within and between studies often depend on the scope of the
report (e.g. whether they include benefits to customers of the
company doing the R & D).

The Results of R & D
Of course, it is far easier to measure inputs than outputs in the areas of science
and technology. That is, we can more readily quantify the resources going into
the performance of research and development than the new or improved
products or processes that result.
Nevertheless, several economists have attempted to estimate the overall rate
of return from research and development performed in the United States in
recent years. As shown in Table 5, the estimates of R & D payoffs range widely.
The lower figures usually are limited to benefits to the company performing the
R & D, while the higher estimates include uses by the customers of the company
and other firms. Surely, we would expect individual analysts to differ in their
calculations. What is reassuring is that virtually all of the measured returns to
R & D are impressively high.
In addition, the tax reforms of 1981 included a new tax credit for incremental R & D, an incentive in addition to direct federal spending in this area.
Preliminary evaluations show limited effects in terms of added private-sector
R & D undertakings. However, the temporary nature of the tax credit is cited
as an important limitation; the credit is scheduled to expire as of December 31,
1985. In its current consideration of tax reform legislation, the House of
Representatives voted last December to extend the life of the tax credit, but not
to make it a permanent feature of the Internal Revenue Code.

In any event, data published by the National Science Foundation show a rapid
upturn in growth rates of both federal and private expenditures on R & D in
recent years and thus an acceleration in total R & D spending in the United States
(see Table 6). During the four-year period from 1980 to 1984, federal spending
on R & Din real terms (adjusted for inflation) rose 12.2 percent a year. This was
a significantly more rapid growth rate than the 9.4 percent average for the
preceding four years. During the same periods, private-sector-financed R & D
spending rose at a greater rate-14.2 percent a year since 1980 and 13.9 percent
annually in the prior four years.
Some of the specific instances of recent state and local investments in R &
Dare noteworthy. Since 1983, Michigan has invested more than $50 million in
small, new companies. Three other states-Ohio, Illinois and Indiana- have
spent more than $250 million on programs for new, high-technology entrepreneurs. In addition, the 13 states of the Midwest Governors Conference each
have contributed $250,000 to open the Midwest Technology Development
Institute in Minneapolis.
There are already some promising indicators of the effects of the stepped up
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Source: See bibliography.

Table 6
REAL OUTLAYS FOR R & D, 1975-1984
(dollars in billions)
Percent
Change

Private
Industry

Percent
Change

Total 1

Percent
Change

Year

Federal
Government

1975

$16.6

1976

18.9

13.90Jo

16.8

15.9%

37.1

15.2%

1977

20.5

8.5

18.6

10.7

40.5

9.2

1978

22.3

8.8

20.9

12.4

44.9

10.9

1979

24.7

10.8

24.0

14.8

50.6

12.7

1980

27.2

10.1

28.2

17.5

57.4

13.4

1981

30.8

13.2

32.8

16.3

65.8

14.6

1982

34.5

12.0

37.7

14.9

74.5

13.2

1983

38.2

10.7

42.7

13.3

83.3

11.8

1984

42.9

12.3

47.9

12.2

93.4

12.1

1

$32.2

$14.5

This process of "creative destruction" described by Schumpeter implies that
some industries will likely decline while others take their place. As pointed out
by Sven Arndt of the American Enterprise Institute, domestic products that
incorporate substantial amounts of research and development become competitive while more mature items are increasingly replaced by imports.
Thus, products with well-established design and production technology often
can be manufactured more economically abroad by producers who acquire
blueprints, technological know-how and even factories in world markets. Their
quality control is frequently superior, and a large part of the production costs
is relatively cheap factory labor. High-priced workers in the United States using
technologies that are available to their lower-cost competitors find it increasingly difficult to compete.

Investments in research and development constitute an important
way in which American industry can hold its own
in the face of virulent foreign competition.
Hence, investments in research and development constitute an important way
in which American industry can hold its own in the face of virulent foreign competition. Improving process technology or offering new and superior products
is a far more positive-and essentially more effective-approach than s~eking
government protection.
In many industries, designing and marketing new and better goods makes the
future bright for an advanced economy such as the United States. That is, this
country frequently maintains its comparative advantage in R & D-intensive
industries. Table 7lists 14 examples of successful penetration by U.S. companies
in Japanese markets. In most cases, product development and technological
skills are listed by the Japanese as the keys to the sales penetration by American
firms. Thus, increased application of the fruits of science and technology to
American industry is an important reason for expecting that today's gloom-anddoom expectations will turn into tomorrow's non-linear economic recovery.

Includes universities and other non-profit institutions.

Note: Actual data have been deflated by GNP price deflator, 1972 = 100.

The Outlook for the 1990s

investments in R & D. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, more
than 15,000 companies make high-technology equipment in the eight states
bordering on the Great Lakes. At least 100 new companies specializing in
biomedicine and computer software have located within 50 miles of the Mayo
Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. Based on historical experience, we can expect
that recent investments in research and development will create some new
product lines and perhaps even new industries with high growth potential.

Highlights of the Report
Let us now sum up the key points we have made. Throughout America's
economic history, feedback effects have helped to end both upswings and
downturns. The United States is experiencing such a change during the current
period of economic slowdown. The feedback effects are arising from such
diverse factors as the deep recession of 1981-82, intense international competition and rapidly expanding defense spending.
The resulting new and positive forces are:
(1) Managerial and governmental actions that reduce the cost of producing
goods and services in the United States.
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Source: U.S. National Science Foundation.

Table 7

Table 7 (cont.)

SOME U.S. SUCCESS STORIES IN JAPAN

SOME U.S. SUCCESS STORIES IN JAPAN

Company

Share of
Japanese
Market

Product

Keys to
Success (as seen
by Japanese)

Consumer Goods (ImQorted}
Eastman Kodak
film

20o/o

brand name; lack of
early competition

Procter & Gamble

50

new product; acquisition of Japanese
company's sales
network

Warner-Lambert

disposable
diapers

razors

Consumer Goods (Local Production}
Coca-Cola
soft drinks

70

new product; use of
Japanese company's
sales network

60

active advertising;
distinctive production and sales setup (franchises)

Corning Glass

heat-resistant
glassware

30

new product

Kimberly-Clark

tissue paper

20

use of business partner's distribution
network; technological and
product-development skills

Johnson & Johnson

bandages

31

new product; active
advertising

S. C. Johnson & Son

floor wax

30

technological and
product-development skills

Capital Goods (Imported)
Boeing
jet airplanes

60

careful market
research; strong
after-sales service

IBM

40

technological skills

computers
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Company

Share of
Japanese
Market

Product

CaQital Goods (Local Production}
bulldozers
Caterpillar

43%

Keys to
Success (as seen
by Japanese)

technological and
product-development skills; strong
after-sales services

Martin Marietta

concrete mixing
agents

50

new products

Dow Corning

silicon resins

20

use of Japanese
partner's distribution network;
technological and
product development skills

Xerox

copiers

20

technological and
product-development skills; distinctive sales system
(rentals)

Source: Trading With Japan (Tokyo: Keizai Kobo Center, 1985).
(2) Enhanced personal responsibility for the quality of what Americans
produce.
(3) More rapid domestic growth in research and development, the basic fuel
for innovation and technical progress.
The often-painful changes provoked by greater competition, at home and
abroad, range from out-sourcing to reducing labor costs to fundamental corporate restructuring. Simultaneously, many U.S. firms are discovering that
product quality rests primarily with the workers on the front lines of production rather than in quality control departments. At the same time, the expansion of military spending has resulted in an upturn in federal research and
development that has powerful spillover effects in the civilian economy.
None of these three factors yields quick or dramatic changes. Yet the
cumulative and interactive effects that they generate are likely to endure and to
reinforce each other. Virtually all of the changes work in the same direction-
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Figure 3
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1979-1985
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Source: Federal Reserve System
toward generating new and better products that will result in more orders, production, employment, income and profits for American investors, managers
and workers. These changes surely will not prevent the possibility of another
recession during the second half of the 1980s. But they do make for a brighter
outlook for the period beyond, that is, for the decade of the 1990s.
Thus, there is a reasonable basis for expecting that the ability of American
firms to compete in world markets in the years ahead will be substantially
improved. Likewise, the relative attractiveness of domestically produced
products to American consumers should increase significantly. In the process,
the real standard of living of the American people should rise noticeably.
In any event, we need to realize that the industrial sector of the American
economy is far from being in the sad shape that many fear. In a journalistic version of Gresham's Law, it sometimes seems that bad news drives out good. It
surely is not widely known that industrial production in the United States hit
a new high in 1984 when the Federal Reserve's Index reached 122 (1977 = 100).
During 1985, the Index of Industrial Production reached a plateau averaging
124 (see Figure 3). In fact, manufacturing's share of the real gross domestic production has held steady for the last 30 years-at about 25 percent (see Figure
4). Economic naysayers do not have a factual basis for their unalloyed
pessimism. Manufacturing in the United States is not going "down the tube,"
nor are we becoming a nation whose major employers are hamburger stands
and clothing stores.
Foreign Counteractions
On the other hand, the positive developments stressed in this report are not
foregone conclusions. For one thing, foreign competitors can improve on their
26

current strategies while U.S. companies try to catch up.
Signs of such a development are showing in the automobile industry. While
a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll in November 1985 reported that the
percentage of Americans choosing to buy foreign-made cars had declined from
25 percent to 21 percent, it also found that one-third of college-educated
Americans and 30 percent of Americans under 35 years of age said they would
purchase a foreign car. Auto makers emphasize the importance of those groups:
College-educated Americans tend to buy the most expensive cars and acquire
them more frequently. And auto companies have also learned the hard way that
if a young American's first car is foreign-made, it is harder to convince him or
her to "buy American" in the future.
There is no certainty that America's Big Three car makers will succeed in closing the gap. Simultaneous with the improvements in U.S. automaking, Japanese
motor vehicle manufacturers are becoming very different and more dangerous
competitors. They are doing so by differentiating their products according to
function, price and appearance as well as size, attacking the American Big Three
from many directions at once. The Japanese have increased the 21 nameplates
and 46 separate models made in 1980 to 34 nameplates and 74 separate models
last year. "It won't be enough to have both fuel-efficient and high-quality cars,"
says Gerald Hirshberg, director of design at Nissan in California. "What's left
is sheer creativity and agility that will dictate success and failure of new entries."

Figure 4
MANUFACTURING'S SHARE OF REAL GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1956-1984
Percent
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Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
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Nor are the Japanese the only competitors with whom American companies
must deal. The South Koreans are pinning their hopes of opening U.S. maFkets
to Korean brand products on the Excel, a subcompact car introduced in 1985.
If the Excel is successful, it will add to the quieter successes of Korean-made
products such as the Leading EdgeD personal computer, which was the fastestselling product in its industry during the last Christmas shopping season. In
fact, Korean companies also have entered many U.S. consumer-goods markets
such as color televisions as manufacturers for American brand distributors. ''As
the Japanese keep moving 'upmarket,'" says David Cole, Far East specialist at
the Harvard Institute for International Development, "the Koreans can move
in and take over."
Other countries also are improving their competitive positions and the changing relationships at times may be indicative of future trends. For example, Korean
construction companies-who have increasingly been giving their American
counterparts tough competition in bidding on overseas projects-are now complaining about the low-cost rivalry from Turkish and Indian firms.
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